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Key Points: 
• Since the 1980s, there has been a major push in rhetoric and institution-building, 
emphasizing the centrality of attacking the financial lifeblood of drug trafficking networks 
and organised economic crimes. Much progress has been made in legislation and the 
creation of financial intelligence units. However, easier guidance is needed on how to get 
information overseas, and delays in international cooperation lead to under-exploitation 
of financial investigation opportunities.
• Financial investigation is often mistakenly seen only in the context of proceeds confiscation 
rather than in revealing forensically the financial relationships in drug networks.
• Financial investigators – whether police, civilian or trained accountants – need to be 
embedded with operational and intelligence units, so that they are brought in early 
enough to help the investigation as well as to take away proceeds of crime. 
• Criminal finance analysis and UK post-conviction Financial Reporting Orders can be used 
fruitfully to target the most harmful networks – local, national and international – but this 
needs to be mainstreamed. 
• More focus should be given to the appropriate making and use by the authorities of 
suspicious activity reports.
• Little is known systematically about the impact of (a) seizure and (b) confiscation of 
criminal assets on the organisation of drug markets and on price/supply – other than that 
it upsets offenders who find it harder to regain reputation afterwards.
• The term ‘money laundering’ may conjure up too vague and unspecified an image to 
fit the reality. ‘Crime money management’ may be a productive alternative. Many drugs 
traffickers and dealers ‘offend to spend’ and this needs to be factored into more realistic 
estimates of national and global money laundering and savings from crime as measures 
of what financial measures against drugs are capable of achieving.
2Introduction
‘If money laundering is the 
keystone of organized crime, 
these recommendations can 
provide the financial community 
and law enforcement authorities 
with the tools needed to dislodge 
that keystone, and thereby to 
cause irreparable damage to the 
operations of organized crime’.  
The Cash Connection, US Presidential 
Commission on Organized Crime 
(1986, p.63)
It is decades since the Reagan Commission 
used these words to end its call for a new 
focus on financial measures to attack criminal 
syndicates. In the course of that period, one 
might have expected a strong evidence base 
to develop to guide law enforcement today. If 
so, one’s expectations would be dashed. What 
governments include in the category of ‘financial 
crime’ expands ever wider – from drug trafficking 
to ‘all crimes’ as predicate offences for money 
laundering charges; to financing first terrorism 
and later proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction; and to corruption and tax fraud. 
Criticisms are regularly (and justifiably) made that 
the private sector is not doing enough to combat 
these crimes. However, the importance of the 
issues has not been matched by the underlying 
analysis that would tell us ‘what works’ or even 
‘what does not work’, either in the private sector 
or in the public sector. Nor is there any coherent 
‘theory of change’ that predicts what levels of 
financial investigation and asset recovery will 
have what impacts on drugs or other criminal 
markets under which circumstances.
There are volumes of commentary and 
legal analysis, but almost nowhere in the 
world is there any systematic analysis of 
law enforcement or criminal justice inputs 
or outputs, let alone of outcomes in terms of 
reduced crimes of any kind or reduced harms 
arising from the ‘organised’ nature of crime.1 
This is so whether crimes are committed by 
Mafia-type organisations or by the much looser 
and lower level ‘criminal networks’ that still can 
be labelled as ‘transnational organised crime’ by 
the modest requirements of the UN ‘Palermo’ 
Transnational Organised Crime Convention 
2000.2  Instead, there is a compelling narrative 
established initially by the use of tax evasion 
charges to jail Al Capone that has informed law 
enforcement since the Reagan Commission 
recommended a national strategy ‘to unite 
a wide range of law enforcement agencies 
in an effort to strike at the economic heart of 
organized crime’. It runs as a theme within the 
recommended use of financial investigation 
techniques as part of the core forensic process 
for all ‘serious’ crimes for gain and to establish 
the formal and de facto ownership/control 
of proceeds of crime and other assets for 
the purpose of confiscation or civil recovery 
proceedings – which can become an end in 
itself. It also lies behind the global pressures to 
• Financial investigation and proceeds confiscation/recovery can impact upon public 
reassurance and the behaviour of financial intermediaries as well as drug offenders – but 
these goals need to be separated out and evaluated, not just asserted.
• The money laundering risk assessments and the focus on effectiveness in the Financial 
Action Task Force (FATF) Methodology 2013 provide a welcome incentive and opportunity 
to re-appraise financial investigation strategies and concrete practices, in the context of 
drug trafficking, economic crimes, and the increasing trend towards poly-crime activities 
of crime networks.
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better identify risks of financial crimes – both 
those committed against them and, especially, 
other crimes whose proceeds may be run 
through them – and to report them to the public 
authorities, i.e. Financial Intelligence Units 
(FIUs). FIUs are variously located in the police, 
administration or judiciary, with implications 
for their embeddedness and liaison with 
enforcement, despite global membership of 
the Egmont Group of FIUs that aims to improve 
collaboration and standards, whatever their 
format. This is based implicitly upon enhancing 
the potential for ‘capable guardianship’, in 
the language of situational crime prevention, 
as are current G20 proposals to require the 
better identification of the beneficial owners 
of corporations and other legal entities, i.e. 
those who actually control it (see, for example, 
the proposed Levin-Grassley Incorporation 
Transparency and Law Enforcement Assistance 
Act 20133). However, testing and converting 
information about ownership and suspicions 
into intervention action of any kind is far from 
automatic, so the effects of these measures 
need to be analysed carefully. 
Hitherto, the march of the international anti-
money laundering (AML) process has appeared 
to be remorseless, and it has been extraordinarily 
successful in attracting support from most 
constituencies apart from libertarian4 and far 
left groups, offering all of them the prospect 
of greater purchase on their favoured crime 
problems. However, analysing the impact on 
investigative resources ‘on the ground’ and then 
of AML on levels of crime and – a separate issue 
– on how crimes are organised5 has received 
far more modest attention, conceptually and 
empirically. A key problem for reviewing the 
macro impact of financial investigation and 
associated measures like confiscation is that 
at one end of the scale, proceeds of crime 
are ‘estimated’ in their trillions globally, but 
proceeds of crime actually confiscated are in 
the very low billions globally, creating an annual 
deficit of trillions of dollars.6 Looked at in this 
way, the challenge of getting interventions to 
reach out and stop such vast sums is so great 
that the temptation is to give up and opt for the 
celebration of modest operational successes, 
or the promotion of radical alternatives such as 
taxing and regulating the illegal drugs market; 
but irrespective of views about that, depenalising 
other organised crime activities such as 
corruption, fraud, people trafficking and robbery 
does not seem to be a serious alternative, and 
those particular problems will not go away of 
their own accord. So this report makes no claim 
to be offering a certain route to success: merely 
an overview of some better and some false steps 
on the way to whichever goal is specified.
Proceeds of Crime - saved; consumed in business expenses including corruption; and spent in 'lifestyle' 
without assets remaining
Financial and/or other Investigator Awareness of Link of Cash/non-Cash Asset to Suspect
Conviction or Civil Recovery Action (including cash seizure)
Making of Freezing/Conscation/Civil Recovery Order
Enforcement of Order - domestic/overseas
Actual conscation/forfeiture
Impact on:  this oender; other actual oenders; potential oenders; community sense of justice 
and security; self-nancing of investigations and recovery expenses
4To assist the reader, a set of processes was 
mapped out above to show the various decision 
stages involved – these may occur out of the 
sequence depicted here. For example freezing 
orders or simple seizures of cash and financial 
documentation may (and probably should) 
occur earlier on before the assets are dissipated; 
and if the offenders are under surveillance, this 
may be because of financial investigation or 
other tracking mechanisms.
The international framework
The Italians might claim that their efforts to get 
banks to record cash deposits to deal with crimes 
to finance the brigate rosse began the process 
in the 1970s. But the AML movement started 
in earnest in 1985 with national efforts in the 
USA to deal with domestic drugs and organised 
crime, followed closely by the UK in 1986, and 
morphed rapidly into the Vienna Convention 
in 1988,7 the ‘temporary’ establishment of the 
Financial Action Task Force (FATF) in 1989, and 
the Council of Europe Strasbourg Convention 
1990 (revised in the Warsaw Convention 2005).8 
Good accounts of the history exist elsewhere,9 
and there is no need to repeat it here. What is 
rarer is to examine analytically what the system 
aims to do and how the operative mechanism 
actually or even plausibly works. The theories 
underlying the expected impact of financial 
crime controls usually assume that drugs 
traffickers and dealers exercise rational choice 
(narrowly defined) and that broad situational 
prevention and targeted enforcement can 
reduce opportunities and motivation. More 
broadly – and setting aside other penal 
principles such as punishing criminals for bad 
actions because they deserve it – AML controls 
rest on five foundations:10 
• Individual prevention relies on due 
diligence by business, and on the passing 
on of (a) transaction data (CTRs) in some 
jurisdictions and (b) regulated bodies’ 
suspicions (STRs or SARs) in all jurisdictions 
to stop criminals from either ‘predicating’ 
criminal activity (e.g. where laundering is 
part of the original crime, such as some 
embezzlements and corporate (tax) fraud) 
or laundering funds, because they will be 
unable to open accounts or because there is 
too high a risk of identification from account-
monitoring processes before they have got 
away with their crimes and/or funds.
• Individual incapacitation occurs by 
freezing and confiscating the illegitimately 
acquired assets of suspects and convicted 
offenders, which in turn deprives them of 
capital to commit further crimes, thereby 
reducing their criminal capability. Properly 
enforced, the criminal must repay their 
gains – whether from laundered funds, 
licit funds, or by any other means. This is 
in addition to any incapacitative impact of 
custody or even of conviction per se, i.e. 
people and companies requiring licenses 
as ‘fit and proper persons’ can no longer 
practice legally upfront.11
• Individual deterrence occurs when 
criminals fear a high risk of exposure if 
they open up accounts, and/or, if they 
use corporate fronts or buy other assets 
from the regulated sector. Consequently, 
they limit crimes beyond their capacity 
for personal/group lifestyle consumption 
and physical storage. This overlaps with 
individual prevention.
• Group deterrence occurs when AML 
punitive sanctions suppress organised 
crime, partly because a sufficient number 
of individuals who might otherwise act as 
enablers are deterred. Collectively, if there 
is a level-playing field, this reduces their 
ability to use different national regimes or 
institutions within a national regime to find 
a weak link.
• Community support for the rule of law 
and government is engendered when an 
AML/confiscation system enhances ‘just 
deserts’ by stripping offenders of their ill-
gotten gains and is seen as lessening the 
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e.g. drug dealers or generalist crime 
entrepreneurs are no longer seen as role 
models. The public face of AML (and of 
civil asset recovery) may reduce public 
anxiety about the impunity of evil-doers 
and contributes to the public’s sense of 
justice. The sense that crooks should not be 
allowed to benefit from the fruits of crime is 
an important policy driver and a motivation 
for financial investigation.
Thus, in the FATF Methodology 2013,12 
Immediate Outcome 7 (prosecutions, etc.) 
discusses the ‘Characteristics of an effective 
system’ and asserts: ‘Ultimately, the prospect 
of detection, conviction, and punishment 
dissuades potential criminals from carrying 
out proceeds generating crimes and 
money laundering’. Immediate Outcome 8 
(confiscation) asserts: ‘Ultimately, this makes 
crime unprofitable and reduces both predicate 
crimes and money laundering’.
The regulatory system is intended to operate 
by using prospective criminal/regulatory 
sanctions and regulatory monitoring to 
pressure and to persuade into greater social 
responsibility an expanding range of otherwise 
legitimate institutions that are categorised as 
‘gatekeepers’ or potential ‘enablers’ of crime:13 
(1) to identify and monitor their potential and 
actual clients and customers far more 
rigorously than they did in the past, turning 
away those who do not pass identification 
and prudential requirements (and 
perhaps deterring some from applying for 
accounts);  
(2) to develop systems for identifying patterns 
of behaviour that are likely (or are believed 
to be likely) to be associated with various 
forms of crime.  
What is known about the effects of the AML 
measures that are based on these theories 
and assumptions? Very little is publicly 
known about how difficult drugs or other 
offenders nowadays find it to launder money, 
let alone about their detailed risk perceptions 
of different modes of laundering; the only 
available studies cover a narrow set of 
offenders in the Netherlands and the UK.14 
Fairly recent British and Dutch research based 
on interviews with imprisoned traffickers (of 
drugs and/or people) suggests that they had 
modest money laundering sophistication and 
did not find the system problematic to bypass. 
As in ‘fencing’ stolen goods, one might expect 
knowledge by people willing to offend to act as 
a constraint upon the development of criminal 
careers. Much depends on how plausible it is 
that the sources of funds can be represented 
as being licit when saving or investing: but 
a global, well-advertised set of financial 
intermediaries exist upon whom to experiment, 
and expectations of being reported following 
failed attempts may be quite low. Judging from 
the continued involvement of major banks in 
negligently or actively facilitating a variety 
of suspected illicit activities, and the relative 
impunity of institutions that are ‘too big to 
be prosecuted’, normal risk perceptions of 
relevant parts of financial institutions are not 
nearly high enough to deter all serious non-
compliance to AML regulation, though without 
increasing perceived and/or actual detection 
risks and reducing elapsed time to action, 
raising sanctions alone may not work. 
Indeed, without doing compliance ‘mystery 
shopping’ internationally to examine the true 
state of due diligence and reporting – which 
I proposed two decades ago in the UK – it 
is difficult to single out particularly reckless 
institutions except in the aftermath of scandals 
that, for example, engulfed Wachovia and HSBC 
for their role in laundering proceeds of drug 
trafficking on the Mexico-US intersection.15 
Thematic inspections by the former Financial 
Services Authority and by World Bank funded 
experimental exercises have revealed the poor 
state of compliance in the UK and among some 
financial intermediaries elsewhere, at least 
as regards ‘Politically Exposed Persons’ who 
6may be involved in drug trafficking.16 However 
although infiltration and undercover work 
by ‘cooperating witnesses’ have been used, 
‘Sting operations’ have not been tried against 
elite mainstream financial institutions, though 
controversially they were against Mexican 
banks in the DEA’s Operation Casablanca 
in 1998, creating conflict with the Mexican 
authorities as it seemed clear that they were 
committed without domestic authorisation or 
communication on Mexican territory. Whether 
Mexican banks were especially badly behaved 
compared with US ones is not a matter of 
public knowledge, and may not have been 
a factor in the decision-making as to which 
institutions to target.
For AML as a whole, the evidence to date 
offers little that could guide judgments 
about the optimal balance between financial 
investigation and other tools for criminal 
investigation, and between prosecutions for 
money laundering/financing of terrorism 
and prosecutions for other offences. There is 
also no evidence regarding the supply side 
and demand side effects of convictions of 
either primary offenders (e.g. drug traffickers) 
or intermediaries on the market for money 
laundering other than self-laundering. Thus it 
is difficult to judge the extent to which the law 
enforcement and criminal justice component of 
AML may properly be assessed on a continuum 
from effective to ineffective. There has been 
no coherent assessment of what success looks 
like in drugs AML beyond fewer drug problems, 
etc., and linking such ‘outcomes’ later to the 
AML efforts would not be easy. 
Nevertheless, the recent FATF guidance 
states:17
‘(13) Countries should ensure that financial 
investigations become the cornerstone of ALL 
major proceeds-generating cases and terrorist 
financing cases and that their key objectives include:
• Identifying proceeds of crime, tracing 
assets and initiating asset confiscation 
measures, using temporary measures such 
as freezing/seizing when appropriate.
• Initiating money-laundering investiga-
tions when appropriate.
• Uncovering financial and economic 
structures, disrupting transnational 
networks and gathering knowledge on 
crime patterns’.
Models of organised crime and 
corruption
When working out a strategy for enforcement, 
a key question is working out what kind of 
problem you are dealing with. This was the 
cornerstone of Judge Falcone’s approach to 
dealing with the Italian Mafia. Here we confront 
clearly the theory mistake of ‘one size fits 
all’ and the dangers of using the same term 
‘organised crime’ to fit a vast range of formats 
from the Mafia, Irish paramilitaries and Latin 
American (mis-labelled) ‘cartels’ at one end to 
three burglars and a window cleaning business 
at the other end of an organisational spectrum. 
There is a need to allow in our models of 
how crimes are organised for variations in 
both (a) the financial arrangements needed 
to keep the people and activities going and 
(b) the strategies to impact on their activities 
and – where this itself constitutes a serious 
threat – on the people committing them. The 
link with corruption is also salient. In some 
developing countries, transnational bribery, law 
enforcement corruption and major organised 
crime are connected and are concentrated 
politically.18 In other societies, politicians are 
not heavily involved but law enforcement and 
criminal justice corruption may be rotten apple 
or rotten barrel, sufficient to reduce risks of 
apprehension, conviction and asset confiscation, 
depending on the risk appetite and connections 
of the offenders and the control environment in 
which they find themselves. 
7Implications for policing and 
criminal justice strategies
The models of how serious and organised 
crimes are put together rationally should 
affect control strategies, though the action 
imperative of needing to feel and show that 
one is doing something should never be ruled 
out. Corruption affects targeting opportunities 
locally and transnationally. Elsewhere I have 
examined critically what can be expected 
from FIUs in developing countries in dealing 
with Grand Corruption.19 Can one reasonably 
expect much more in more developed 
countries (since developed-developing is a 
spectrum)? In the developed world, NGOs 
such as the Basel International Centre for Asset 
Recovery (ICAR), the Francophone SHERPA, 
and the World Bank’s Stolen Assets Recovery 
(StAR) group have been active against corrupt 
kleptocrats, some of whom are also involved in 
drug trafficking and other activities by granting 
‘protection’/extortionists and/or as co-
organisers of drugs and other crime networks. 
However, such activist groups calling for 
standalone money laundering charges and 
international asset-freezing are seldom to be 
found acting against ‘drug traffickers’ alone. 
Thus, in addition to expensive surveillance, 
action against drugs finances depends largely 
upon information held in the private sector and 
available to law enforcement only (a) as routine 
or suspicious activity reports passed on to FIUs, 
and (b) as a result of court orders which vary 
according to powers granted separately in each 
country, depending on their preference for 
balancing privacy against investigations. The 
EU has been particularly active in the mutual 
cooperation field, via the Camden Assets 
Recovery Inter-Agency Network (CARIN) – of 
which the USA is also a full member – and the 
European Asset Recovery Offices. To increase 
the speed of investigations, some member 
states have centralised bank registers, and 
information about the beneficial ownership of 
those accounts – i.e. the people who ultimately 
own the assets – should also be obtainable, 
though major traffickers are unlikely to reveal 
themselves by their personal names. 
Nevertheless, moving to effectiveness as well 
as efficiency, it is not always obvious what 
people mean in practice by using a network 
to attack (and to disable or just to disrupt?) 
another network, and what role can financial 
investigation play in that, and under which 
conditions? If we look seriously at confiscation 
and financial settlements, it is difficult or 
even impossible to strip out penalties against 
financial intermediaries from those against 
‘primary offenders’ like traffickers. Perhaps 
that is not the point: intermediaries may be 
more vital than individual primary offenders – 
even ‘kingpins’ – to the system of crime, if any 
system can be identified. But how do we know 
what the general or even specific deterrent 
effect is of the sorts of sanctions against 
intermediary institutions like Wachovia and 
HSBC, beyond increasing their compliance 
departments and cost base, and exiting clients 
(including possible drug traffickers and their 
allies) who might attract the wrath of regulators 
and prosecutors in the future?20 
Organised crime and drugs enforcement have 
traditionally been engaged in the search for 
Mr. Big. Kingpin strategies may reassure the 
public with dramatic arrests; they may even 
frighten some talented criminals off aiming 
for leadership positions (though their need to 
assert their masculinity may pressure them 
in the opposite direction). But they do not 
reduce the level of criminal activities unless 
that ‘kingpin’ has unique or hard-to-replace 
technical and/or brokerage network skills, or 
unless there is some actual demonstration 
effect of action against them on the supply 
of drug dealers at the local, regional or 
national level, which may take time to become 
manifest. ‘Follow the money’ strategies have 
been critiqued for distorting enforcement 
priorities,21 especially when they become an 
end in themselves. Conversely, they can be 
attacked for closing their eyes to the vast gap 
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even the most conservative estimates of the 
profits of organised crime and corruption. The 
latter risks being a policy of despair, since no 
plausible set of investigations could recover 
that volume of criminal assets, even setting 
aside sums spent on ‘lifestyle’. 
In an earlier era before asset seizure law was 
tightened, Blumenson and Nilsen22 found 
that 80 per cent of US asset seizures (by 
volume) were unaccompanied by any criminal 
prosecution. Baicker and Jacobson23 use data 
from the Drug Enforcement Administration’s 
System to Retrieve Information from Drug 
Evidence and other sources, showing that the 
average price paid for heroin is significantly 
greater in locations where the police are 
more active with asset forfeitures. Worrall 
and Kovandzic24 conclude, ‘police agencies 
rationally elect to pursue the most lucrative 
avenues for asset forfeiture, availing themselves 
of generous state laws’. They found no clear 
evidence that a greater amount of forfeiture 
was used in states that permit the police to 
receive the largest part of the proceeds, though 
measurement difficulties may have affected this 
result. They also learned that in states that 
place limits on what the police can derive 
from forfeiture, local law-enforcement 
agencies work around such restrictions by 
teaming up with federal agencies to mount 
‘adoptive forfeitures’ which pay them based 
on their part in the enforcement process. 
States that allow the police to keep all or 
most forfeiture funds were predictably 
found to have less recourse to adoptive 
forfeitures. They note (p. 239) that ‘Our 
study offers some preliminary evidence 
that forfeiture turns policing into policing 
for profit. Whether this practice is bane or 
boon for law enforcement we cannot say… 
Waging war on drugs is time consuming 
and expensive, and forfeiture revenues are 
often pumped right back into drug task 
forces, undercover investigations, payment 
of informants, and so on. It is difficult to fault 
law-enforcement agencies for exploiting 
legal arrangements that maximize their 
potential to offset the high costs associated 
with America’s war on drugs’. The latter 
perspective is critiqued by Skolnick25 on 
ethical grounds, partly because – though 
this is not articulated – it encourages 
specialised agencies to become addicted 
to drug proceeds confiscation. This 
echoes an earlier study – based on covert 
participation – which concluded that ‘Before 
asset forfeiture policies were established, 
narcotics cases were assigned priority by 
the amount of drugs involved and the level 
of threat to society posed by suspects. The 
observations made here, however, show 
that asset seizure has become the primary 
objective of drug enforcement’.26
While arguing for more financial investigation, 
Levi and Osofsky27 questioned the assumption 
that confiscation would always deter and 
incapacitate offenders, arguing that it was 
plausible that some offenders would be 
motivated to recover their pre-confiscation 
financial position. Furthermore, to the 
(disputable) extent that drug traffickers extend 
credit to purchasers deemed trustworthy or 
vulnerable to their pressure, large amounts of 
financial capital may not be needed to begin 
business again. One can overdo such scepticism 
– there are instances where criminals struggle 
to regain their criminal standing. Furthermore, 
as the re-imprisonment in 2011 of London 
gangster Terry Adams for failing to report 
his finances accurately demonstrates, post-
conviction Financial Reporting Orders (for up to 
10 years) under Sections 76 & 79-81 of the UK 
Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005 
can be highly impactful on serious offenders 
and perhaps on ‘the serious crime community’, 
if not on drug price and availability.28 However 
the community reassurance component of 
the ‘criminal asset degradation ceremony’ – 
though not formally measured yet – can be a 
significant benefit, even if it does not raise by 
much the ‘spirit level’ of social equality.29 
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forfeiture is employed primarily against drug 
traffickers and customers of streetwalking 
prostitutes. Neither group enjoys high social 
approval; nobody proposes forfeiting the 
private company jet in which the corporate vice 
president flew off to a meeting with competitors 
at which prices were fixed in violation of the 
antitrust laws’. This is less true now, as corrupt 
insider dealing has become a major target for 
the US Attorney (Southern District of New 
York) and for the Securities and Exchange 
Commission, and a range of organised crime 
investigative techniques has been deployed 
against them. Nevertheless, drugs-related 
cases remain internationally a central feature of 
organised crime investigations and forfeitures 
throughout the world. They triggered the 
Irish and British civil recovery regimes, and 
predominate in European national and cross-
border investigations. 
However when reviewing financial 
investigation, it would be a mistake to focus 
on assets ordered to be confiscated or actually 
confiscated as the key output indicator. Given 
the ubiquity of recorded financial transactions to 
identify geo-location, interactions with others, 
and motivations, financial investigation has an 
important role to play in mainstream serious 
crime policing, from non-domestic homicides 
to crimes for financial gain, including corruption 
by public officials. A Thematic Review in 
Scotland concluded in 2009: ‘In contrast to 
the central position occupied by the SMLU 
[Scottish Money Laundering Unit] in SCDEA 
[the Scottish Crime and Drug Enforcement 
Agency], force financial investigation units 
(FIUs) were typically situated in peripheral 
positions in their forces. This seemed to 
reflect the peripheral position of financial 
investigation and POCA [Proceeds of Crime 
Act 2002] generally’.31 Recent interviews by 
this author suggest that some of the more 
enlightened UK and Dutch policing units are 
using financial investigations in an integrated 
way, to the limited extent that their resources 
(and prosecutor skills and enthusiasms) allow. 
This brings us to the issue of the practice of 
financial investigation.
Financial investigations in 
practice
International evidence suggests that with 
increased levels of organised crime come 
increased levels of corruption,32 though the 
sequencing is not self-evident. Buscaglia and 
van Dijk further argue that the more resources 
in the form of specialist units that are employed 
in curbing crime, the more effective they are in 
fighting corruption. However this omits the issue 
of Potemkin Villages of apparent institutional 
activity,33 which are used for international window 
dressing or can be deployed aggressively 
against political opponents: a downside of the 
trend towards greater financial transparency, 
and one that is most apparent in some former 
Soviet countries but can happen elsewhere.
It is worth separating out the objectives of 
enhancing financial investigation from increasing 
the level of financial penalties from proceeds 
of crime investigation and enforcement. The 
absence of research on financial investigation 
in most countries means that this section relies 
largely on UK and Dutch research.34 
Increasing proceeds of crime 
confiscation
The global leader in aggressive administrative, 
civil and criminal asset forfeiture traditionally 
has been the USA. It sets out its mission thus:
‘The primary mission of the 
Department of Justice (DOJ or 
the Department) Asset Forfeiture 
Program… is to prevent and reduce 
crime by disrupting, damaging, and 
dismantling criminal organizations 
through the use of the forfeiture 
sanction. This is accomplished by 
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means of depriving drug traffickers, 
racketeers, and other criminal 
syndicates of their ill-gotten proceeds 
and instrumentalities of their trade’.35 
The Net position (taking away compensation to 
Madoff and other fraud victims), an indicator of 
the Assets Forfeiture Fund’s future capability 
to support ongoing operations, decreased to 
US$1,620.4 million in Financial Year 2012. 
But neither it nor the Strategic Plan36 give 
any details of effectiveness beyond some 
examples of activities, nor any methodology 
by which we could evaluate that impact. The 
reports give information about the new victim-
focused approach to returning confiscated 
assets – a clear public good – but this is not 
relevant to drug trafficking. Good process 
guides are publicly available,37 as well as 
other law enforcement-only manuals; and the 
UK has sought to professionalise proceeds 
of crime and financial investigation skills 
learning. However, no literature can be found 
that has examined seriously the impact of 
financial forfeitures on drugs markets or on 
more general social harm. 
After a slow start in the 1990s,38 in the first 
decade of the 21st century, the UK adopted 
a target culture toward asset recovery, 
providing incentives to chief officers to adopt 
that same mind-set with the promise of a 
percentage of cash rewards from the assets 
recovered. Showing the motivational benefits 
of incentivisation, the number of financial 
investigators deployed increased, as did assets 
recovered by forces and likewise the rewards 
to forces; the Labour government published 
the assets recovered in a form of league 
table with rankings comparable against other 
forces.39 Since then, the negative effects of 
targets have been recognised and targets have 
been abandoned, but incentives remain. For 
cash seizure, half of the funds are retained 
by the Home Office, and the other half given 
to the law enforcement body responsible 
for the seizure. For other asset confiscation, 
half is retained by the Home Office, 18.75 
per cent given to law enforcement, a further 
18.75 per cent is given to the prosecutor, 
and 12.5 per cent of assets seized is given to 
the courts (though HM Courts and Tribunals 
Service charge law enforcement bodies for 
every cash seizure they bring to court, so their 
actual ‘take’ is greater). Nevertheless, financial 
investigations are overall significantly more 
costly than the amounts returned to the police, 
so it might be more accurate to describe 
this not as ‘policing for profit’ but as mostly 
‘policing for less financial loss’.40 England and 
Wales confiscations totalled £161.3 million 
(US$250.28 million) in 2010/11 – the highest 
in the last decade – almost a third of which was 
cash seizures. The great majority of these are 
low value cases, which currently have to be 
expensively adjudicated in Crown Courts.
The Scottish Government allocated £500,000 
(US$775,850) to the police service over 
3 years, which was match funded by the 
forces involved, to recruit an additional 19 
financial investigators (FIs). The success of 
this led to approval of an additional £625,000 
(US$969,690) to continue funding the FI 
posts over a further 2 years, running until 
the end of 2013-14. In 2012-13, £12 million 
(US$18.6 million) were taken from people 
involved in activities such as drug dealing, 
human trafficking and benefit fraud with 
around £8 million (US$12.4 million) coming 
from convicted criminals; the remaining £4 
million (US$6.2 million) came from cash 
and assets seized through civil court orders. 
Altogether, in the decade since the Proceeds 
of Crime Act 200241, the Scottish government 
stated that it received £80 million (US$124.1 
million) from asset recovery: the data show 
that a significant proportion of this was 
obtained from corporate crimes rather than 
from drugs, though the cases highlighted in 
its Serious Organised Crime Strategy Spring 
Update 201342 are mostly drugs cases that 
show only intermittent evidence of being 
financial investigation driven. In Wales, £46 
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million (US$71.35 million) were recovered 
from criminals in the past decade (BBC Wales, 
21 Mar 2013), the total for England being 10 
times higher. 
Elsewhere, there is more information about 
legislation and processes in the Detailed 
Assessment Reports compiled under the 
AML regime than there is about effectiveness 
or even end-to-end efficiency in practice: 
effectiveness is expected to be assessed in 
the Fourth round of the FATF AML regime 
commencing in 2014. One model is to offer 
incentives of asset sharing and, more rarely, 
even personal incentives. At one stage, the 
Thai government was inspired by international 
pressures to offer personal bonuses to staff 
to increase the confiscation of assets, and 
this may have had the effect of reducing the 
willingness to accept (or demand) bribes, as 
well as increasing confiscation levels. Whether 
it led to any human rights abuses is not 
known. This policy has now been abandoned. 
Consistent with the UN Convention Against 
Corruption 200543 (with 140 signatories 
and 167 parties as of July 2013), the World 
Bank has focussed heavily on criminalising 
illicit enrichment and the legislative and 
monitoring processes that underlie that, the 
aim being to attack the support infrastructure 
of drug trafficking as well as to deter and 
prevent bribery.44 However good the technical 
assistance offered – a major growth area – 
much needs to be done to stimulate internal 
commitment as well as mutual legal assistance 
for financial investigation, asset freezing, and 
asset recovery: and not only in developing 
countries. Cross-border assistance needs 
stimulation, and a distinction needs to be made 
between the ability to confiscate proceeds of 
crime held abroad and their return to the trial 
jurisdiction: confiscation abroad may need 
to be incentivised and if its aim is to have an 
impact upon offending (rather than mainly on 
the public sense of justice), it does not matter 
where the proceeds end up.
The risks involved in an increased focus 
on proceeds of crime confiscation
The dangers in a focus on recovering proceeds 
of crime as a method of financing law 
enforcement are noted in several jurisdictions:
• Chasing the ‘low hanging fruit’ – obtaining 
money from a lot of small cases (e.g. 
money couriers) could lead to a lack of 
understanding of the methods or social/
financial systems involved 
• A focus on income generation instead of 
criminal justice outputs and outcomes – 
this can lead to a reluctance to prosecute or 
even use as witnesses good sources of cash 
seizures
• A failure to recognise that improved 
investigations and prosecutions are a 
prerequisite for presenting a realistic 
estimate of criminal assets in court and 
taking the assets from criminals
• The creation of the ‘asset recovery’ 
culture has had some negative effects 
on appreciation of the wider benefits 
of financial investigation. This culture is 
difficult to break even in the UK, where the 
financial targets have been abandoned as 
counter-productive.45
Especially when resources are few, law 
enforcement often resorts in practice to cash 
seizures and relatively ill-concealed assets 
domestically held – such as are found in drugs 
rather than fraud cases.46 The creation of a 
national asset recovery agency (ARA) in the 
UK led to very few cases being referred to it 
by law enforcement,47 before it was closed 
down early after audit reviews found it was 
costing far more than it recovered – a likely 
outcome in early years in any part of the 
world, given the legal challenges and attrition 
that are commonplace in complex cases. 
The rate of ‘wealth evaporation’ is fairly high 
among crime-entrepreneurs: on-going Dutch 
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research shows that around 10 per cent of 
the attempted recovery cases have had to be 
written off. Moreover attrition between initial 
assessment and final recoveries is common: 
the Dutch Organized Crime Monitor 201248 
shows that an initially assumed amount of more 
than €60 million (for 102 offenders, US$79.9 
million) shrinks dramatically in the course 
of the various court stages and in the end, 
only about €10 million (US$13.3 million) are 
received by the authorities.49 This expectation 
of delayed (and probably reduced) benefits 
needs to be factored into reforms to avoid 
disillusionment. Especially in times of austerity, 
law enforcement agencies with targets to meet 
want to keep some rewards of their labours. 
This is one reason why the USA has organised 
itself into Federal/State Task Forces, to reduce 
institutional and social barriers among local 
and state police to joint working. 
Financial investigation not tied to 
confiscation
Assisted by the infrastructure of AML, financial 
investigation generates both leads for and tests 
of investigation hypotheses in a variety of fields, 
including police and governmental corruption, 
some of which is connected to drug trafficking. 
An experienced forensic accountant in public 
service, advocating for greater attention to be 
given to the financial relationships involved 
in crime networks, noted: ‘The cash spine 
provides the first stage in developing a model 
for the OCG [organised crime group] business 
process. The business command structure 
that emerges from this can, in turn, provide 
a structure for considering the application of 
anti OCG legislation based around the crime of 
directing serious organised crime, such as now 
exists in Scotland’.50 
In community impact terms, low financial 
value cases may still be important in taking out 
local nuisance groups who may be ‘criminal 
upcomers’. Targets were never imposed in 
Scotland, but before the UK government was 
persuaded that targets in England and Wales 
were counter-productive, forces never seemed 
to meet them, creating pressure to further 
resource them51 or to abandon them by default 
of not prioritising them. Conversely, whilst an 
increasing range of potential ‘enablers’ in the 
financial industry and the professions were 
compelled to make suspicious transaction 
reports, proportionately these reports were little 
used during investigation processes. 
A study in England and Wales by Brown et al52 
notes that financial investigations were rarely 
used to identify organised criminality in the first 
instance. Financial investigation techniques were 
applied in more than half of the cases studied 
during the pre- and post-arrest investigation and 
the case-building phase. Where used, in addition 
to identifying organised criminality, financial 
investigation contributed to investigation and 
case building through:
• identifying the extent of an organised crime group
• locating assets
• identifying ownership and use of properties
• evidencing offenders’ lifestyles
• tracking movements
• placing people at particular places at 
particular times, linking them to criminality
• identifying additional offences and offenders.
In 30 out of the 60 cases assessed, financial 
investigation was judged to be ‘essential’ in 
determining the case outcome: in 14 cases a 
conviction would not have been achieved; in 17 
cases the role of the offender was discovered; 
in another eight cases the role of others was 
identified; and in a further eight cases, further 
offences were identified, with the consequence 
that offenders were prosecuted for more 
offences than otherwise they would have been, 
reflecting the seriousness of their conduct. 
13
These are not judgements about the inherent 
limits of financial investigation – simply 
products of the limited resources available 
which have to be rationed.
Conclusions: Paths to follow?
The term ‘money laundering’ conjures up 
imagery of criminal financial exotica requiring 
specialist skills for very serious cases only. 
Yet due to the extension of money laundering 
legislation globally to cover self-laundering and 
to almost anything criminals do with proceeds 
of crime except spending it modestly in 
immediate consumption,53 it is a ubiquitous part 
of the criminal landscape. A more suitable term 
might be ‘crime money management’, which 
might make it easier to mainstream financial 
investigation by demystifying it somewhat, 
recognising the large spectrum of crime money 
management practices. In some jurisdictions, 
to reduce the risk of poor knowledge leading 
to mistaken approaches to financial institutions, 
only trained people on the approved FI list are 
permitted access to the suspicious activity report 
databases. This is a good practice, both in terms 
of skills enhancement and to generate greater 
accountability: otherwise, financial intelligence 
could be used for extortion from drug traffickers 
or from semi-legitimate businesspeople, or to 
sell to the private sector. However, looking for, 
and using evidence of, drug offender assets 
does not always require specialist skills, and 
even the term ‘financial investigation’ ranges 
from basic ways of thinking about money and 
assets to deprive criminals to far more complex 
accountancy skills. Sometimes, the simple 
juxtaposition of suspects’ lifestyle expenditures 
with their official incomes can tell an important 
story, especially if the investigator has access to 
tax data and it is admissible in court.
I have adopted a tone of cautious scepticism in 
this review because I consider that what is needed 
is fewer grand claims and more of an analytical 
focus on the end-to-end processing of financial 
investigation to conviction and/or to deprivation 
of proceeds of crime. Historically, the AML 
movement has been suffused with evangelism 
in spreading the message to every sector of the 
political economy and the globe. Enthusiasm 
is good, but sometimes greater analysis is also 
needed. The new FATF methodology of 2013 
heralds a more prosaic world of national risk 
assessments and prioritisation, which is to be 
welcomed, in order to replace earlier pressures 
to create similar laws and institutions to make it 
look as if one is doing something effective. The 
difficulty is knowing whether, as part of an end-
to-end process of cutting off crime opportunities 
and disincentivising a ‘career’ in drugs, financial 
investigation has not succeeded because it has 
not really been tried in a sustained fashion; or 
whether it is just another component of drugs 
enforcement that offers the illusion of impact. 
Unless there are some transformative shifts in 
the number of financial investigators and reforms 
of the court processing of confiscation cases 
and substantive offences, there can be no step 
change in the use of financial data in criminal 
investigation and/or no major increases in 
proceeds of crime recovery. Research needs to 
enable clear judgments to be made about what 
is working and what is not. Before research can 
accomplish that, there needs to be proper case 
and data access (as exists in the Netherlands). 
Therefore, we have to be prepared to shift 
major resources in that direction or abandon 
the pretence that financing of crimes and 
laundering the proceeds are central issues that 
drive crime and should drive enforcement. We 
also have to take more seriously the criminal 
motivations of ‘offend to spend’ rather than 
wrongly assume that more than a minority of 
criminals are ‘Protestant Ethic’ entrepreneurs 
aiming to save and integrate all or most of 
their income from crime. This has implications 
for the amount of proceeds that are plausibly 
available for seizure and confiscation, though 
it remains important to sort out transnational 
financial investigation powers and cooperation 
in dealing with assets, both from criminal and 
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civil recovery investigations. The European 
Union (EU) is currently seeking to progress this 
issue, but mutual legal assistance for financial 
intelligence, asset freezing and recovery needs 
to be broader-based than Europe.54
Thus far, we have discussed the situation in 
advanced economies, among whom trust is 
relatively high. However, the AML movement 
is global, and the Egmont Group currently 
(2013) contains 131 FIUs from a vast range 
of countries. With the right support and 
independence of investigation, prosecution and 
trial, financial investigation can be used against 
elite corruption, drug trafficking and economic 
crimes: but such support is politically fragile, 
as the lack of extensive prosecutions following 
the collapse of the Kabul Bank demonstrates.55 
Regional organisations, periodic international 
evaluations of AML and mechanisms such as the 
International Narcotics Control Strategy Report56 
act as bulwarks protecting such independence 
up to a point, though they may push foreign 
policy agendas which can inhibit alternative 
approaches to drug control. But there are strong 
reasons why a ‘one size fits all’ model of AML 
is inappropriate and costly for less developed 
economies, unless it is needed (to protect other 
countries) because a less developed country is 
offering global financial services and serving 
as a criminal money haven for drug traffickers 
and economic criminals elsewhere.57 Trust 
mechanisms must therefore be developed 
between the private sector, FIUs and criminal 
investigators and prosecutors, and this is easier 
to do in some jurisdictions than in others.
To date, we have only a modest evidenced 
insight into what the benefits of financial 
investigation are to weigh against what little 
is known about the costs of enforcement.58 
This is true of AML generally. Lamenting 
the poor state of the evidence about costs 
and benefits of asset forfeiture in the USA, 
Baumer argues that ‘if policy makers are 
committed to making informed decisions, 
then it would be wise to invest in activities that 
could generate the requisite information’.59 
For once, these reflections on the USA do 
apply globally. Let us not underestimate the 
difficulties of linking outputs and outcomes to 
crimes and to financial investigation inputs.60 
That methodology remains to be developed. 
However there needs to be a much stronger 
focus on understanding the evolution and/or 
stasis of patterns of laundering, how and when 
financial investigation is actually delivered and 
used by law enforcement and prosecutors, and 
the use made of suspicious activity reports, and 
actual cooperation between Asset Recovery 
Offices and courts internationally, if any of 
the grand ambitions and claims made in 
political gatherings and annual reports are to 
be grounded in real resources on the ground. 
Some economists test revealed preferences by 
‘willingness to pay’ models, and our willingness 
to pay for more public resources has been 
quite modest: many of the costs are transferred 
(perhaps correctly) to the ‘financial polluters’ in 
the private sector, but the private sector alone 
– whether an enthusiastic or, in some cases, 
a very reluctant partner – cannot deliver a full 
package to keep any type of crime under a 
‘satisficing’ level of control. 
Historically, criminal justice has been about 
‘pursue’ rather than ‘prevent’ strategies, and 
in that framework, using financial investigation 
more efficiently to prosecute ‘bad’ people 
and deliver justice by taking away their liberty 
and their benefits from crime is itself a good 
thing. Alongside visibly controlling tax evasion 
and social security fraud, consumer fraud and 
environmental waste dumping, showing the 
public that others do not benefit from crime 
could influence their behaviour as well as 
being popular. But on current evidence, the 
contribution of financial investigation to the 
‘prevent’ strand of crime reduction policy 
is unproven. No-one could rationally think 
that AML controls in general or financial 
investigation in particular will ‘solve’ the drugs 
problem completely or eliminate high-level drug 
trafficking: to achieve that, there would need to 
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be a step change in transparency and effective 
action against high-level corruption along all 
possible supply chains. However more progress 
on these will facilitate interventions against the 
more harmful individuals, networks and crime 
enablers. The less complex financial activities 
of local drug-dealing gangs can be intervened 
against, without needing international 
cooperation or familiarity with sophisticated 
money laundering typologies. There will always 
be tensions between different interests and 
rights, and sometimes, vigorous efficiency in 
the pursuit of some rights produces global bads 
as well as goods. But there is no point in having 
a strategy if one has no road map for how to get 
from here to there. 
Recommendations
With this in mind, a number of recommendations 
can be made, which apply more readily to 
developed economies: 
• Consideration needs to be given to the 
more routine mainstreaming of financial 
investigation and confiscation, and to 
its impact at different levels of criminal 
organisation, including local and regional 
networks – but this requires a sea change 
in supervisory attitudes and, in some 
countries, prosecutor and judicial training; 
and independent monitoring needs to be 
built into such developments to avoid goal 
displacement 
• The term ‘money laundering’ may conjure 
up too complex and vague an image to fit 
the reality, and ‘crime money management’ 
may be a productive alternative term
• Many criminals ‘offend to spend’ and this needs 
to be factored into the realism of the large 
guesstimates of national and global money 
laundering and savings from crime as measures 
of what financial measures against drug 
dealing/trafficking are capable of achieving 
• More focus should be given to understanding 
the evolution of patterns of laundering, how 
financial investigations are deployed, and 
the appropriate making and enforcement 
use of suspicious activity reports
• Financial investigation and proceeds 
confiscation/recovery can impact upon 
public reassurance and safety; on the 
behaviour of financial intermediaries, and 
on both the behaviour and criminal capacity 
of drug offenders – these goals need to be 
separated out
• The money laundering risk assessments 
and the focus on effectiveness in the FATF 
Methodology 2013 should be used to re-
appraise financial investigation strategies 
and concrete practices, in the context of 
drugs trafficking, economic crimes, and 
the increasing trend towards poly-crime 
activities of crime networks.
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Modernising Drug Law Enforcement Project 
A project by IDPC, with the participation of the International Security Research Depart-
ment at Chatham House and the International Institute for Strategic Studies
Drug law enforcement has traditionally focused on reducing the size of the illicit drug market 
by seeking to eradicate drug production, distribution and retail supply, or at least on the 
stifling of these activities to an extent that potential consumers are unable to get access to 
particular drugs.
These strategies have failed to reduce the supply of, or demand for, drugs in consumer 
markets. Given this reality, and a wider policy context where some governments are moving 
away from a ‘war on drugs’ approach, drug law enforcement strategies need to be adjusted 
to fit the new challenge – to manage drug markets in a way that minimises harms on 
communities. A recognition that law enforcement powers can be used to beneficially shape, 
rather than entirely eradicate, drug markets is being increasingly discussed.
The objective of this project is to collate and refine theoretical material and examples of new 
approaches to drug law enforcement, as well as to promote debate amongst law enforcement 
leaders on the implications for future strategies.61 For more information, see: http://idpc.net/
policy-advocacy/special-projects/modernising-drug-law-enforcement.
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